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A recant article by Dauies, Kaplan, Morris and O'fleara, 'Class Struggle
and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa1 sets out to deal with
the 'periodisation of the political in South Africa, ie changes in the
fom of state', and is concerned to 'understand the historical role of the
South African state in the class struggle .... which specific interests it
served, and how it came to assume its specific and distinctive form1.
However, it would seem that the authors of this article fall short of their
somewhat ambitious aims, and that they thereby raise important questions of
a theoretical and methodological nature about the analysis of the state in
general, and in South Africa in particular. This critique of their article,
which will hopefully be seen as a constructive one, raises two of the most
important areas which seem to present problems. First, it asks why it is
important to ''periodise' the South African state, and what it is about this
state that requires special explanation. It is suggested that the authors
have only gone part of the way towards answering these questions and thus
towards providing a foundation for undarstanding the South African state's
particular characteristics. Secondly, the question of the value and use-
fulness of the concepts 'fractions of capital1, 'hegemony' and 'form of
state1, as they are defined by the authors, is raised. These concepts are
all critically scrutinised, and it is suggested that many of the inadequacies
in the article's treatment of the South African state have their origins in
theoretical weaknesses. Other minor problems raised by the article are
included by implication in these areas of criticism, or are raised in the
appropriate parts of this discussion.
There seem to be two major sets of reasons (and innumerable less major ones)
why it is important to understand the nature of the state in South Africa,
and the stages through which it haa passed. The first set of reasons is
that arising from the fact that the Marxist antflysis of South Africa is still
at an early stage, particularly as far as politics is concerned. In con-
ventional South African studies the state has usually been considered by
writers adhering to either a 'liberal capitalist1 or a pluralist po£nt of
view. Very little has been written specifically on the state by Marxists
which effectively, comprehensively and comprehensibly challenges the
intellectual hold of these interpretations. On one level, there exists the
simple need for a wide-ranging reinterpretation of the major political and
legislative landmarks in South African history, based on a rigorous analysis
of class formation, struggle and decline.
The second set of reasons exists on a deeper level. It arises from what
Davies et all call the 'specific and distinctive form' of the South African
state. Implicit in much of the Marxist literature on South Africa ie a
rough basic agreement, I believe, that the specific form of the South African
state has two aspects to it. The first aspect has occupied the attention of,
amongst others, the authors of the article presently under review. Simply
put, this is the fact that South Africa, a country which experienced imperial
conquest of a far-reaching and violent nature, 'broke out' of the vicious
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However, as far as the second set of reasons is concerned, the article
seems confused and at timss superficial. Tha thesis put forward here is
that Davies at *el fail to provide an adequate basis on which an explanation
of the two unique features of the South African state may be constructed,
and that their failure is attributable to certain weaknesses in their theore-
tical conceptions of •fraction1, •hegemony1 and 'form of state1. While it
is impossible to put forward a comprehensive alternative view in a small
space such as this, it is, I feel, possible to outline some of the major
areas in which Davies et al fall short, end to suggest, in a brief form,
an alternative approach*
Davies, Kaplan, Morris end O'fleara certainly tackle the first aspect of the
uniqueness of the South African state. Although some writers may go so far
as to deny it, it seems that most would agree that whereas before the first
World War, the South African economic and social system was under imperial
domination of a far-reaching and complex kind, by the 1930s economists of
a Rostowian bent could apply to the South African economy terms such as
(TV. 'take-off; and by the end of the second World War the South African system
was set on a path of capitalist development, albeit of a peripheral sort.
A massive change, both in the nature of the state itself, and in the social
formation in which that state was embedded and upon which it acted, seems to
have taken place in South Africa some time between the two world wars. Tha
questions that arise from this fact are many. What was it about the South
African class structure that enabled it to break out of the underdsvelopment
syndrome? What was the state's role in the transformation? And concomitantly,
what was the nature of the transformation undergone by the state during the
move from an 'imperially dominated' system to a capitalist one? The state,
it seems, was both an agent and a subject of change in a class society.
Davies et al have turned to the Poulantzian concept of 'hegemony within the
power bloc* for answers to these questions - or at least their interpretation
of this concept. The power bloc, they argue, consist of the various 'fractions'
of the dominating classes. Within that bloc one fraction (or in some cases
a combination of fractions) attains a position of 'super-dominance' - in other
words, it dominates not only the social formation as a whole, as would any
t;~ dominant group, but all the other fractions of the dominant classes in addition.
It is this fraction that is, it seems, the 'hegemonic1 one. If, by an analysis
of the legislative and political actions undertaken by the ruling group, the
nature of the hegemonic fraction can be deduced in any one period, then the
'periodisation' of the South African state may be outlined; part of th^s
periodisation will inevitably provide an understanding of the change in
'hegemony' from imperialism to capitalism in South Africa. Their article pro-
ceeds along lines dictated by these theoretical presuppositions. They do not
confine themselves to the problem of the transition from imperial to national
. capital, but attempt to put forward a complete explanation of all changes in
the power bloc between 1920 and 1950. But the problem of the transition
nevertheless occupies a central place in their argument, which may be summarised
roughly as follows.
In imperial times, it seems obvious that of ell the various fractions of
capital, it was the mining fraction that uas in a 'hegemonic' position. Mining
dominated not only the pre-capitalist formations, and the working class, but
it aleo exerted pouar over tha manufacturing, agricultural and commercial
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sectors of the ruling class. Imperial capital, in other words, could
virtually be equated with mining capital, and the character of the South
African social formation in the era of imperial hegemony could be traced
back to the all-pervading influence of mining.
During the 1920s, however, a series of crises which had shaken mining hege-
mony came to a head. The first World War and the subsequent depression, the
1922 unite mineworkers strike, and the rise of local manufacturing, all pro-
vided a complex structure of pressures on the power bloc, opening the way
for a different fraction of capital to attain a position of 'super-dominance1
within it. Davies et al argue that the fraction poised to take over was
what they call 'national capital1. This is a rather poorly-defined category,
but it seems at least in the 20s to have consisted of manufacturing and
agricultural capital. In the 1924 election the Pact government came to power,
as the representative of this fraction of capital. As the article puts it:
Eventually, in 1924, in alliance with a fraction of the new
petty bourgeoisie and supported by strata of the white and
black wage earning classes, national capital achieved
hegemony.^
C
After this victory by national capital, the South African power bloc was the
scene of several complex changes in hegemony. First, national capital apparently
maintained its hegemonic position until the 2nd World War; the political
turmoil of the early 1930s was not, according to these writers, indicative of
a shift in hegemony, but was merely conflict on the level of the 'political
scene' - ie the party political level - and not on the more basic, level of
'political practices' where the real shifts in hegemony take place. But during
World War 2 'agriculture lost its hegemonic position' and 'the special con-
ditions of the war produced an unstable alliance between manufacturing and
mining capital within which manufacturing maintained a tenuous hegemony'.
(one of Davies et al's many italicised phrases.)
After the war had ended things became even more complex, for the 'structure of
hegemony collapsed1. Because the United Party was 'unable to accommodate all (
the contradictory interests of the fractions of capital it represented' the
National Party was able to attain political power in 1948, and it defended the
re-establishment of the hegemony of 'national capital' against the ever-powerful
position of imperial mining. Nevertheless the 'power bloc remained disorganised
for much of the fifties' and it was only in the 1960s, in fact, that a clear
structure of hegemony could be said to have re-emerged, when the 'NP stats ...
reorganised the power bloc to establish the hegemony of interpenetrated mono-
poly capital'*
In summary, the article seems to see South Africa's development something along
these lines:
date
nat/imp.
fractions
pre-24
imperial
mining
24
national
manufac.
+ agric.
33
national
manufac.
+ agric.
40
national
manufac.
48 50s
disorganised
but
national being
defended
60s
national +
Internationa
monopoly
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Several sRrious criticisms have been levelled at this analysis and others of
its type, "tlarke has pointed to the inadequate definition of 'fraction*^
to the explanatory ueakness of a framework that allows the most crucial
twenty years in South Africa's recent history to be categorised as years
of 'disorganisation in the power bloc1; and to the apparent similarity
between this form of analysis and conventional 'interest group' theory.
Some, but not all, of these criticisms are valid, and most of them are
taken up, either explicitly or implicitly, in the following critique. But
what seems clear from this diagrammatic representation of the psriodisation
of the South African state, and what Clarke's critique is unable to cope
with, is the vividly marked break between the pre-1924 period, when 'imperial
capital' dominated; and almost the entire post-1924 period, at least until
the 1960s, when 'national capital' was, it is alleged, either itself hege-
monic, or was being defended. Whatever problems there are with their analytics
framework, surely Davies and his co-authors have provided confirmation of
the existence of the same 'massive change1 discussed above?
The problem is that the authors do not treat it as a 'massive change*. It is
accorded some significance in the conclusion, whsre they state that 'the
early assumption of hegemony by national capital is thB unique feature of the
South African state1. But in the analysis itself, this change is simply
treated as a matter of re-arrangement in the power bloc, resulting in legis-
lative and political changes of a variety of sorts. This enormous change,
from imperial to national capitalism, is accorded no more importance in their
analysis than other changes in the system of dominance. This is puzzling.
Surely it is a question of great importance to Marxism? Houi did imperial
capital, which twenty years earlier had supported an imperial war on a vast
scale in order to secure its hegemony, suddenly lose that hegemony at a stroke
- and an electoral stroke at that? Whereas elsewhere in Africa , such as in
Kenya and Algeria, the second World War, plus local, long-lasting rebellions
and wars, involving thousands of troops, deaths, and vast expense, were not
sufficient to prevent imperial capital from imposing a neo-colonial solution,
in South Africa the first World War and the 1922 strike (admittedly a highly
critical event but one which was effectively and rapidly crushed) seem to
(v;,» have been sufficient to force imperial capital to give up the ghost.
The crux of my criticism is that Davies et al fail to distinguish between
basic changes in the nature of capitalism itself, and less basic changes withii
a definite and relatively stable capitalist system. While the change from
imperial-dominated to national capitalism may be said to constitute a basic
change, the change within national capital from dominance by manufacturing and
agricultural to dominance simply by manufacturing, may not.
- •
Furthermore, it is for the more basic kind'of change that it seems analytical
concepts such as 'form of state1, 'hegemony1 and even 'fractions of capital1
should be reserved. It seems that it is their too liberal use of these con-
cepts, and hence their devaluation of them, that has rendered Davies et al
vulnerable to the kind of criticism levelled by Clarke. In their article,
Davies and his co-authors use *hegemony' to mean little more than the hidden
hand of capital; they reduce 'imperial' and 'national' capital somewhat
economistically to particular economic sectors such as mining and manufacturing;
-6-
while the 'form of state1 seams to mean little more than the nature of the
interests represented by the political parties in power at any particular
time. One suspects that Clarke is right, and that rather than talking about
'hegemony' they are talking simply about 'interests1 and their realisation
at a political level. This in itself, in spite of Clarke, is an extremely
valid and useful exercise, as long as 'interests1 are separated into political
and economic, and as long as they are not defined subjectively. But Davies et
al make neither of these refinements. And in any case interest theory alone,
however Marxist, does not lead one to an understanding of the 'form of state1
nor of 'hegemony'. It rather enlightens one about elections and governments,
about laws and their administration. This explains the heavy dependence of
this article on elections. Every time there is an election, there seems to
the authors to be a change in hegemony. There is a change, but it is not in
hegemony. It is in the structure of interest-representation. The Oavies
article points to so many 'changes in hegemony1 that when a real change does
occur, it is barely accorded the attention it deserves. ("
The major reason for this inadequate treatment of the change in South Africa
from imperial to national capital is that too much weight is given to the
concept 'fractions of capital'. Because mining capital was imperial, and
because mining capital also predominated in South Africa before 1924, it is
assumed that 'imperial capital1 is simply another fraction of capital, on a
par with agricultural capital, commercial capital and manufacturing capital.
But surely this is not so? Imperial capital is not a 'fraction of capital1
at least in the* narrow sense in which the term has been used in most of the
Poulantzian literature. It cannot be reduced to, or equated with, an
economic 'sector1 such as "mining1. Imperial capital is rather a whole
structure of capitals, and it exists on economic, political and ideological
levels. It is - even in Poulantzas's own terms, and surely in Marx's, - a
class rather than a fraction of a class.
In South Africa imperial capital was not synonymous with mining by any means.
Import-export commercial capital, foreign owned manufacturing, and agricultural
capital all played vital parts in the political, economic and ideological f
maintenance of the imperial South African social formation. South Africa, like
any underdeveloped country today, was 'locked into' an imperial economic system
of imports and exports, of surplus being drained out, of manufacturing for the
benefit of the monopoly enclave rather than for the full industrialisation of
the economy, and of surviving and exploited pre-capitalist modes of production
on the periphery. Within the'overall domination of imperial capital in South
Africa it is surely true that mining capital held a place of 'super-dominance1,
or in Davies et al's terms, 'hegemony'. But this was the dominance of one
fraction or interest within a whole complex and intertwined structure of
interests. Moreover, because imperial capital was a class, it is clear that
mining's dominance was not simply a matter of voluntaristic tussles for
hegemony in the power bloc, but was the result of the fact that mining was
beet placed to realise the interests of capital as a whole at that time. The
dominance of mining was inseparable from the class dominance of imperial capital
in general, and indeed was only a.manifestation of it.
The inadequacies of the article's treatment of imperial capital are masked by
the fact that mining capital was fairly clearly and consistently in the vanguard
of imperial domination throughout, and the identification of imperial with
.....//••
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mining capital is therefore easily made. But when it comes to their treatment
of 'national, capital' the authors flounder. Leaving aside, for the moment the
vexed question of how the change actually came about in the South African
case, when the Davies article comes to discuss 'national capital1 it is
clearly unable to reach any sort of adequate conceptualisation of it. Some-
times it is clearly meant to refer to agricultural capital; sometimes it
refers to agricultural and manufacturing capital; sometimes to manufacturing
capital alone; and sometimes it refers to Afrikaner capital (presumably of
both an agricultural and manufacturing nature). In their anxiety to equate
national capital with a fraction, or a combination of fractions, the authors
find themselves unable to cope, and once more open themselves up to Clarke's
criticisms of their inadequate definitions and their tendency to enter the
realms of 'bourgeois sociology1.
This too arises from the fact that national capital cannot be reduced to, or
equated with, its constituent fractions. National capital too is a whole
//•'X. structured combination of capitals, of fractions and even of fractions of
fractions. It too could warrant being called a 'class1 rather than a fraction
of a class, its repercussions on the social formation being far-reaching on
the economic, political and ideological levels. By the 1930s, elements not
only of agriculture and manufacturing, but also of mining and commerce, were
clearly in the national capitalist camp. And by the 1940s, this class had
become strong enough to alter some of the central features of South Africa's
imperial social formation. Most of the major obstacles to the ending of
underdevelopment had been removed: surpluses were no longer being drained,
away at quite such a rate, but were being diverted; key infrastructure! state
enterprises had been set up; industrialisation had ceased to take place only
in the interests of the monopoly enclave; and commerce had ceased to play the
role of locking the South African economy into a world system of imports and
exports, but had become nationalised instead. At least on the economic level,
national capital had brought about significant changes. The question of whethe
these constituted full hegemony is raised below.
Oust as had been the case with imperial capital, the question of which sector
a.- dominated uiithin national capital is crucial. Here it seems that Davies et al
^"'.- have mistaken the conventional concept of 'interest group' for the Marxist con-
cept of 'interest'. For aa had been the case'fifith imperial capital, it is
surely the sector, or 'fraction1, that is most in tune with capital's overall
objective interests that is going to be able to lead the capitalist class as a
whole? And it seems that it is highly unlikely that the agricultural sector
could ever be placed in a position to do so, in a phase where national capital
is rising to a position of predominance. The history of agriculture in South
Africa seems to be one of compromise rather than leadership. Moreover, agri-
culture has only a secondary interest in industrialisation, not. a primary
necessary interest. It is therefore unable to lead capital as a whole in a
period where the transformation of the social formation in the interests of
industrialisation, is necessary. At most, agriculture, (and the same applies
; to commerce and mining) can act as a crucial political and strategic ally to thi
necessarily leading and dominant sector in a period of industrialisation -
manufacturing. Flanufacturing capital must be, and, I would argue in the South
African cast), was,in the vanguard of the class interests of capital as a whole.
And just as manufacturing capital in this era was "English speaking", so was
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tha character of the national bourgeoisie as a whole "English speaking",
although its .alliances with agriculture lent to this English-speakingness a
particular character.
Thus the discussion by the authors of this article of tho period in which
national capital was allsgsdly dominant is superficially confused, and deeply
wrong. The appearance of agriculture in the 'power bloc1 is not evidence of
the 'hegemony' of 'national capital1, but simply of the political power of
tha agricultural interest. It certainly cannot be cited as evidence that the
roots of the English and Afrikaner traditions lie in the distinction between
imperial and national capital. The claim that national capital achieved
hegemony as a result of the 1924 election, based as it is primarily on the
clear presence of agriculture in the government, is quite clearly incorrect.
The supporting evidence (that industrial capital had switched to support
the Pact Government) is flimsy, and may easily be disproved. A reading of
the industrial journals of the time indicates that manufacturing capital *•
(which had never clearly supported any party, because of its incompatibility v
with a political system forged to suit the interests of imperial capital) did
not support the Pact government to any significant extent at all, but that it
continued to place its faith in the SAP for several years after the Pact
government had achieved power.
The nature of South Africa's national bourgeoisie in this period, its compo-
sition, its ideology and its ability to replace the imperial bourgeoisie, is
far too complex a subject to be explored here. But what can be said is that
it is clear that at least by the 1940s that bourgeoisie was rising to a place
of dominance; and that this cannot be simplistically explained in terms of
the 1924 election. Some wider, deeper, and more far-reaching change was
taking place in the South African social formation than Davies et al would seem
to acknowledge* Although, as I have said, they may pay lip-service to the
magnitude of the change, their conceptual framework does not allow for it to
be fully accounted for. A conception of 'hegemony1 which refers simply to
alterations in domination within the power bloc between fractions is hardly
adequate* What we have here is a change in the power bloc itself.
It is for this reason that it would be a pity to abandon the concept of 'hege-
mony1. In its original Gramscian form, and in certain passages in Poulantzas's
writings, this concept seems well able to cope with the magnitude of thB change
us are discussing. Indeed it seems partly to have been designed precisely to
cope with such a change rather than with the more limited changes referred to
by Oavies et al - Gramsci's concern with the 'hegemony' of the working class
surely going deeper than simply the power bloc. In his discussion of hegemony
Poulantzes in fact outlines two meanings of the term. The first, he says,
indicates 'how in their relation to the capitalist state the political interests
of these (the dominant) classes are constituted, as representatives of the
'general interest1 of the body politic1. Here he is referring to class domi-
nation and not fractional domination. Quoting Gramsci with approval (and some
reservations not relevant here) he points to the ideological, as well as poli-
tical and economic significanca of hegemony:
Previously germinated ideologists become 'party1, come into con-
frontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a
(I:-
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a single combination of them tends to prevail, to gain the upper
hand, to propagate itself throughout society - bringing about not
only *a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual
and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle
rages, not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus
creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series
of subordinate groups-4
Gramsci too, therefore, refers to 'class hegemony1 and not fractional dominate
Furthermore, by his concept of" 'intellectual and moral unity1 and 'posing all
the questions around which the struggle rages' he makes of the concept of
hegemony something more than a synonym for 'domination1.
The second way in which Poulantzas defines hegemony is as 'the particular
domination of one of the dominant classes or fractions vis a_ vis the other
dominant classes or fractions in a capitalist social formation'. It is only
in this second, far more limited sense, that Davies et al have used the con-
cept. Thus they have removed from it all notions of class interests (as
opposed to 'fractional interests' - thus laying themselves open to Clarke's
criticisms once more), and all notions of ideology. To them, hegemony refers
simply to' the supremacy of one fraction over others. It is not surprising,
given this limited definition, that the class struggle is not, in spite of thei
claims to ths contrary, an integral part of their analysis, but appears spora-
dically as a 'factor' in 'periods of crisis'. One wonders whether the editors
of RAPE are correct in their statement that although 'SODS readers might feel
that the articles which follow concentrate unduly on the machinations of capita
and the squabbles between its different fractions', we may rest assured that
'such an emphasis cannot be confused with a similar bias in much South African
historiography which is based on the assumption that the history of South
African whites is the history of South Africa1. Davies et al seem to come clos
to treating blacks in South Africa as the objects of policy, rather than
protagonists in the class struggle; this is yet another consequence of their
theoretical inadequacies.
It would not seem incompatible even with Poulantzas's writings to enlarge the
concept of hegemony so that it may embrace these wider and more significant
aspects of hegemonic class domination (and evajj- if this widening of the concept
is a violation of Poulantzian orthodoxy, perhaps few would object in the light
of the above critique). How useful it would be to have a concept such as
•hegemony* to capture the way in which imperial capital, led by mining capital,
was able to mould the Sout^ African social formation, not only in its own
objective economic interests, but in its political and ideological interests as
well, so that 'imperial1 South Africa came to be characterised by a particular
system of exploitation, by a particular form of state, and by a particular
•hegemonic ideology1 as well. And how much more illuminating than the narrow
'interest' and 'fraction'-based accounts, would it be to have an account of the
rise of national capital in these complex terms.
Whether or not it is called 'hegemony', if this conceptualisation of the nature
of class domination (whether imperial or national) is used, then the problem of
explaining the transition from one form of hegemony to another becomes far great
than Oavies et al would allow. Instead of an analysis which at times seems in
i••••/iu>•
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danger of resembling a game of musical chairs in the power bloc, the explanation
would have to be undertaken on a number of different levels. Rooted in an
analysis of ttt© economic interests of capital as a whole, it would then have
to branch out into' an analysis of the political and ideological realisation of
those interests, in both class and 'fractional' terms. Clarke is so right when
he points out that capitalists are not the all-seeing, all-knowing beings that
Davies et al would have us believe, but are basically short-sighted, narrow-
minded and incapable of recognising their class, as opposed to their individual
interests. But what Clarke does not acknowledge is that this is precisely why
an examination of the activities, of the ideologists, intellectuals and strate-
gists of capital must occupy a central place in any analysis of its interests,for
is through these that the petty-minded individual capitalist is enlightened as
to his wider class position, and if he will not be voluntarily enlightened, he
is coerced Into conformity- It is only on this basis that it would be possible
to explore the different and changing places of the different fractions within
the overall class structure of capital as a whole. Commerce, for example, would
have to be analysed in terms of its changing relationship to imperial and nation^"
capital respectively; the same uould have to be done for mining, manufacturing,
and to a lesser extent, agriculture. The analysis of capital would have to be
undertaken in the context of its class relationships with the subordinate and
intermediate classes, with the existing state, with the form of state it wishes
.to bring into being, and with other forms of capital. Only then could one under-
stand the kind of hegemony needed by national capital and the long and painful
processes necessary to its achievement.^
It is on the basis of this criticism of the Oavies concept of 'hegemony' that
the second aspect of the South African's state's uniqueness may be discussed.
It will be recalled that the second 'unique1 feature of the South African state
was defined as the fact that it, unlike most (if not all) other capitalist states,
is not based upon what Poulantzas calls 'the general interest of the people/nation
In fact, Davies et al barely mention this aspect of the state in South Africa,
perhaps because they consider (incorrectly) that it has been adequately explained
by others, such as Trapido, Wolpe, Legassick and O'Neara, who have more clearly
addressed themselves to the problem; and perhaps also because, as will be pointed
out below, their conceptual framework makes it difficult for them to confront thir
problem directly, ^
First, it is important to obtain a clear idea of what precisely is meant by
a state based nominally upon 'the general interest of the people/nation'.
According to Poulantzas it is one of the capitalist state's distinguishing
characteristics that it:
 4
has inscribed in its very structures a flexibility which concedes
a certain guarantee to the economic interests of certain dominated
classes, within the limits of the system. To the extent that this
guarentee is in accordance with the hegemonic domination of the
dominant classes, ie with their political constitution vis a vis
this state, as representatives of the general interest of the
people, this concession is part of the state's very function. The
concept of the capitalist state of course involves a specific
function for political ideology, a form of power based on 'consent1,
which is organised and directed in a specific manner for the domi-
/ll..
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natsd classes .... The notion of the general interest of the
'people', an ideological notion covering an institutional
operation of the capitalist state, expresses a real fact,
namely that this state, by its vary structure, gives to the
economic interests of certain dominated classes certain
guarantees which may even be contrary to the short-term
economic interests of the dominant classes, but which are
compatible with their political interests and their hegemonic
domination.6
Of course Poulantzas is not the first to have remarked upon the tendency of
the capitalist state to 'incorporate' those classes whose interests lie in
direct contradiction to those of the dominant classes. Indeed one non-Marxist
study of the various ways in which such states have undertaken this incorporate
and the various political institutions resulting from these historically specif
incorporationist structures,that made by Barrington Moore, was influential in
/-";.. the revival by Trapido and Legassick of Marxist studies of the South African
^' state. What is implied by a reading of Poulantzas, and what these early
Marxists in South African studies observed, was that there are not many example
of capitalist states that fail to perform this incorporationist function in qui
so extraordinary a manner as does the South African state.
This, it should be noted, is a problem which tends to be confused with the
problem of the survival (or revival) of the pre-capitalist modes of production
in the South African social formation. This confusion arises from the fact
that two problems - that of the decline of pre-capitalist modes; and that of
the new militancy and settled nature of the black working class - came to a
head in South Africa during the 1930s and 40s; and that both were solved in
a particular way after 1948. The apartheid system presented a solution to
the crisis of the 1940s in this double sense and it is only once the duality
of these problems and their solutions is recognised, that it will be possible
to explore the relationships between the two aspects of the apartheid system -
the reproduction of labour power in the reserves, on the one hand, and the
exclusion of the working class from the state apparatuses on the other. While
some considerable progress has been mads in the first sphere, very little has
(.•: been made in the second. It is to this problem that the rest of this paper
now addresses itself, •»*•
The first step in such an analysis is to pinpoint the precise relationship
between 'capitalism' on the one hand, and the need for 'incorporation' on the
other. This relationship, »I would agree, is essentially a relationship between
a particular kind of capitalism, that is, national capitalism, and the fully
fledged proletariat. Incorporation is not undertaken by any kind of capital -
far from it. It is undertaken by capital within social formations where nation;
industrial capitalism has become entrenched, (hegemonic) and where the processes
of primitive accumulation and proletarianisation have been completed. The
reason for this lies in the necessary path of development of national capitalisn
and the necessary class relationships to which it gives rise. Poulantzas has
explored this necessary path in theoretical terms; while I have elsewhere
attempted to show its development and its deflection in the South African case.'
The question for South Africa therefore becomes, not simply 'why was the black
proletariat not incorporated?, but 'why, once national capital had begun to
achieve a place of dominance, did it not undertake to incorporate it?1. In othe
words, it is not a question of a general nature, which may be answered by
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referenca to the whole course of capital's development in South Africa; but
it is a very gpecific question indeed, related to the period in which national
( as opposed to imperial ) capital rose to a hegemonic position.
It is perhaps easy to see now why the theoretical inadequacies of Davies et al
in relation to their discussion of hegemony prevent them from confronting this
aspect of the unique South African state. For the question of non-incorporation
is very clearly related to the question of hegemony. It is essential to under-
stand the place of national capital in the South African social formation in
all its complexity, before we can begin to understand its failure to incorporate
If national capital is reduced to its fractions, and worse, if there is no clear
idea of the nature, the interests, the strength and the path of development, of
the leading fraction, then the confusion surrounding 'hegemony' will be com-
pounded when it comes to 'incorporation1.
In support of this it may ba argued that it is not difficult to explain how
the state in South Africa came to assume its exclusive and racist form in the
period of imperial hegemony. Nany states under imperialism took similar forms;
indeed it is a frequent characteristic of imperial states that they succeed
in confining their sphere of legitimacy - though of course not their sphere of
repression - to the dominant mode of production. The 'colonial1 state pre-
serves the hegemony of imperial capital as a whole through an efficient re-
pressive apparatus and limited, centralised and usually non-incorporationist,
ideological state apparatuses. Imperial hegemony as a result takes on a
particular (often hierarchical) ideological and structural form, too complex
to be explored here.
But what _is difficult to explain is why this characteristically 'imperial1 state
form in South Africa did not change fundamentally as far as the 'incorporationist1
aspect of it is concerned, with the alleged change in 'hegemony' from imperial
to national capital. .We have already suggested, albeit briefly, how in other
respects the state took on new forms. The power bloc changed; the economic
interests of the dominant class changed; the political interests flowing from
those economic interests changed, as did their ideological realisation. In
almost all of these respects, the 'imperial1 state seems to have given way, or (
et least begun to give way, to a more truly 'capitalist' state - for it was full-
blooded 'national' capitalism that was being created at the time. And yet in
the one, crucial aspect of racial exclusion the imperial state appeared to
survive. :
The Davies article is precluded from beginning to answer this question adequately
because of its simplified view of the process of change. Its theoretical frame-
work does not require it to acknowledge a really fundamental difference between
the imperial and the capitalist states. Indeed, paradoxically, for an article
which claims to be concerned with frequent and significant changes in the 'form
of state', the Davies article points to no real changes in the fundamental nature
and structure of the state. To the authors, it seems, a capitalist state, whether
imperial or national, is a capitalist state. Once imperial capital has attained
hegemony, It has created a capitalist state whose basic structure will remain
constant, while the members of its power bloc may change places from time to
time. Thus for them there is in fact nothing to explain - for the lack of change
between the two eras may simply be accepted as an indication of the fact that
•••••/ij*•
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South Africa has always had a capitalist state, and that tha form it took ,
in imperial times necessarily and unsurprisingly remained with it throughout,
unless there was good reason to change it.
In this view they are reinforced by their narrow conception of hegemony, which
leads them to conclude, as we have seen, that the change in hegemony from
imperial to national capital took place in 1924. Since there was little evi-
dence at that time of so-called national capital' wishing to change the racist
character of the imperial state, it is assumed that this is because the imperil
stats and national capital were inherently compatible in this respect.
And finally, when they are confronted with evidence that in the 1930s and 19405
leading sections of national capital had begun to press for the incorporation
of the black working class, they are able to cope by reference to their some-
what narrow concept of the 'fractional' nature of capital. Because they do not
see the class nature of national capital, but merely reduce it to its fractions
they are able to relegate this central and significant fact to the status of a
'fractional interest1. Manufacturing capital, of a particular sort, they
acknowledge, was interested in 'liberalisation'; but its fractional interest
is accorded no more significance than the interests of any of the other fractic
at tha time. Moreover thBir conceptualisation of hegemony does not permit their
to acknowledge that the nationalised sectors of mining and commerce supported
the 'liberal1 strategy.
A wider view of these questions, based on the concept of class and hegemony out
lined above, would lead far more directly to the problem. For one thing, the
change in hegemony from imperial to national capital would not and could not
be so clearly placed at 1924. Ply own work seems to indicate that in fact it
was only by the mid-19303 that the national capitalist class could begin to
assert itself in the powerful manner required if it was to oust imperial capita,
completely. Many of the inconsistencies and errors in Davies et al's work -
some of which are unerringly pointed out by Clarke - would be ironed out if it
was accepted that national capital struggled long and hard to achieve a place
of dominance.
Further improvements upon the analysis would be made if it were recognised that
national capital is not able to impose its hegejnony upon the social formation
the moment it achieves economic dominance. Davies et al cannot 'prove1 the
existence of national capitalist hegemony by reference to laws passed in the
period immediately after the 1924 election. Changing an entire social formatior
is not as simple as that. This would explain why, although national capital's
ideologists were intensely concerned to put forward an incorporationist view
throughout the thirties, it was only by the 1940s that they were in a politicall
strong enough position to begin to implement some of them in a very limited
manner. But one thing is certain, that these proposals for liberalisation shoul
be recognised for what they really were, the expression of the overall class
interests of a national capitalist class, under the leadership of manufacturing,
which was on^y just ascending to a position of hegemony. The incorporationist
liberalism of the 30s, 40s and 50s was not tha ideology of a small and beleaguer
minority. It occupied a central place in the ideological media of EnglishT
speaking culture as a whole - indeed in every ideological state apparatus, from
the universities to the press. And significantly, as would befit a hegemonic
/14..
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ideology, this liberalism also occupied a central place in state apparatuses
whose functions were to incorporate or redirect grievances of the truly sub-
ordinate classes - blacks.
Thus the defeat of the liberalisation strategy cannot be attributed simply to
the alleged weakness of the single manufacturing fraction. (What evidence is
there, incidentally, of the 'weakness1 of a sector which was by now of sub-
stantial size and significance.) It must be explained, surely, in terms of
some peculiarity in the mode of development of the incorporationist interest
in South African industrialism, .and in the nature of the desired hegemony, of
the national capitalist class as a whole.
No analysis has yet, it seems, undertaken such an explanation. But there are
some possible avenues for further exploration that arise partly out of my own
work on capitalist interests in South Africa, and partly out of Davies et al!s
own analysis.
r
The first possibility is that national capital was, bacause of its great need v
to appease the white working class, able to deflect its incorporationist need
in relation to the black working class. Incorporationism is usually sub-
stantially (although not entirely) based upon the need for expanding and co-
operative markets. Since white workers were in a position to demand signifi-
cantly higher wages anyway, it seems that national capital was in a position to
channel much of its need for markets into the white sector at first, and was
thus able to continue with the established system of mining ultra-exploitation.
The complexities of this argument are substantial and will not be pursued here.8
The second possibility is inat as late as 1948, national capital had not, in
fact, actually achieved full hegemony yet, in the broadest sense of the term.
This is supported by the fact that although in many respects industrialisation
had been launched in South Africa, the imperial state had not yet been fully
dismantled, the incorporationist strategy had not yBt been implemented, and the
problem' of the reproduction of the labour force under national capital had not
yet been fully solved. This would explain imperial capital's continuing pouer
to resist incorporationism, without reducing the events of the forties to a
conflict between 'fractions1.
The third possibility, which would reinforce this, is that the 1948 change in
government, while it did not represent a proper challenge to this national
capitalist class on all levels, did represent a challenge to the existing com-
bination of capitals by one fraction - nascent Afrikaner capital. As has been
argued in several papers, Afrikaner capital was not in a strong enough position
to join the rest of national capital on equal terms - it still had problems of
accumulation to overcome; it certainly could not afford an incorporationist
strategy yet. And because national capital had not yet achieved full hegemony
this backward Afrikaner sector could exploit the weakness of the 'transitional'
system. It thus arrested the progress of national capital, but on the other
hand, it could not and did not reverse it, for in spite of its in-between stage,
national capital was strong and not weak.
This would explain something which most have attempted to explain in terms of
the lack of conflict between Afrikaner nationalism and English capitalism -
the failure of the Nationalist government to challenge English capital sub-
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stantially during the 1950s, and the similarities between the Fagan and Sausr
proposals for the black working class. It would also explain something which
is sometime^ left unexplained - the differences between these two sets of
proposals; the ongoing opposition, by English capital to the Nationalist failu
to incorporate the black working class; and the much-debated claim by ideologi
of this class of capital that time would eventually erode the irrational
structure of apartheid. All things being equal, they were quite right - time
might well have eroded Afrikaner capital's need for harsh accumulation pro-
visions, just as it did in the case of earlier capitals. The vision the
ideologists of the 'conventional wisdom1 were putting forward was one of
Afrikaner capital eventually 'catching up1, and of the national capitalist cla;
as a whole at last being able to assert its full hegemony, incorporation in-
cluded.
However, time did not erode this need because of the fourth possible factor -
one which is mentioned by Davies et al and which seems to be the one element,
.--. according to Clarke, on which all Marxist Southern Africanists seem to agree-
t: the rise of monopoly capital in South Africa in the 1960s. It seems possible,
although this is a claim which would have to be substantiated empirically, thai
with the success of Afrikaner capital accumulation the division between Afrikar
and English national capital indeed dissolved. But instead of giving way to
united national capital, it gave way in the 1960s to the reconstitution of the
capitalist class into monopoly and competitive sectors. Of these it seems to
have been the monopoly sector that has gained a place of dominance (or in Davie
et al's narrow use of the term, hegemony). Now monopoly capital, if it has a
necessary interest in the incorporation of the working class at all, seems to
need an entirely different type of incorporation from that of national, com-
petitive capital. Indeed, imperial mining capital was monopoly capital, and
its lack of interest in incorporation has clearly been shown. It is thus
possible that it was the rise of monopoly capital to a place of dominance that
finally did reverse national capital's arrested move towards, incorporation, and
that finally permitted the previously somewhat unreal policy of apartheid, to
be implemented, in a modified form, in reality.
These tentative suggestions would need to be explored empirically, on the basis
(L-' of the wider concepts outlined above. Such an analysis would need to be under-
taken in terms of economic, political and ideological factors, along much the
same lines as the analysis of the earlier phase of capital's development in
South Africa. It would need to be aware that elections, including the 1946 one,
do not necessarily mean changes in hegemony, and that if and when si/ch changes
take place, they are bound *to be slow, complex and multifaceted. It needs to
bear in mind the differences between Afrikaner and English industrial capital,
as well as all the other divisions within capital already mentioned, and it
needs to recognise the inadequacies and limited usefulness of the concept of
'fraction1. It would need to be aware that if 'monopoly capital1, whatever that
may mean in precise terms, is truly rising to a place of 'hegemony' (in the wide
sense) in the South African social formation, this would represent a far-reachin
and very fundamental change - indeed it would constitute a new, massive problem
for those attempting to analyse hegemony, the form of state, and the class
structure in South Africa. It would not be a change that could be lightly treat
simply through a consideration of 'fractions of capital1.
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To conclude, it should perhaps be re-stated that the major flaw in the Davies
piece Iie9 precisely in its over-use and under-definition of the concept
'fraction1.' Btat it is not that capital should not be seen in all its divided
and conflicting parts - it is essential to any Marxist political analysis that
wishes to avoid crudB economic determinism that classes be seen in all their
complexity. But to reduce classes to their fractions is to close off some of
the most significant areas of investigation. It,too, leads to economism, of
a different sort. Ultimately, it devalues the Marxist conceptualisation of
politics.
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